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Abstract
Single neurons in cortical area LIP are known to carry information relevant to both sensory and value-based decisions that
are reported by eye movements. It is not known, however, how sensory and value information are combined in LIP when
individual decisions must be based on a combination of these variables. To investigate this issue, we conducted behavioral
and electrophysiological experiments in rhesus monkeys during performance of a two-alternative, forced-choice
discrimination of motion direction (sensory component). Monkeys reported each decision by making an eye movement
to one of two visual targets associated with the two possible directions of motion. We introduced choice biases to the
monkeys’ decision process (value component) by randomly interleaving balanced reward conditions (equal reward value for
the two choices) with unbalanced conditions (one alternative worth twice as much as the other). The monkeys’ behavior, as
well as that of most LIP neurons, reflected the influence of all relevant variables: the strength of the sensory information, the
value of the target in the neuron’s response field, and the value of the target outside the response field. Overall, detailed
analysis and computer simulation reveal that our data are consistent with a two-stage drift diffusion model proposed by
Diederich and Bussmeyer [1] for the effect of payoffs in the context of sensory discrimination tasks. Initial processing of
payoff information strongly influences the starting point for the accumulation of sensory evidence, while exerting little if any
effect on the rate of accumulation of sensory evidence.
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Introduction
One of the most successful enterprises of experimental
psychology and systems neuroscience has been the elucidation of
mechanisms underlying simple forms of decision-making. Green
and Swets [2] provided the theoretical groundwork for this effort
with their theory of signal detection. Incorporating Bayesian
principles, Green and Swets accounted for the psychophysical
decisions of human subjects in numerous circumstances by
invoking an optimal combination of sensory information about
the stimulus and prior information about the probability of a
particular response being correct. The final weight of evidence
favoring one or the other response was expressed as the ‘‘likelihood
ratio’’, a formulation that has exerted a prodigious impact on
subsequent studies of decision-making and on the development of
artificial decision-making algorithms.
While the original formulation of Green and Swets was
designed only to account for the accuracy of choice data, a rich
body of experimental and theoretical work subsequently extended
the insights of signal detection theory into dynamical models in
which evidence is accumulated gradually over time during single
trials. Originating in seminal work by Laming [3], Link and Heath
[4] and Ratcliff [5], these models depicted the decision mechanism
as a ‘‘diffusion’’ process in which a decision variable assumes a
neutral value at the beginning of a trial, then ‘‘drifts’’ gradually
under the influence of incoming sensory information toward a
‘‘barrier’’. The decision is reached when the diffusing decision
variable encounters the specified barrier, or threshold. The key
variables in such models are the starting point of the diffusion
process, the drift rate of the decision variable under the influence
of incoming sensory information, the distance between the starting
point and the decision barrier, and noise associated with all three
variables. A related class of models, called accumulator models,
invokes separate accumulators to model forced-choice tasks with
two or more alternatives [6,7], and recent versions of such models
allow for the possibility of competition among the accumulators
and decay or leakage of accumulated information (e.g. [8,9,10]).
These models generate remarkably precise fits to both accuracy
and reaction time data with relatively few parameters, and
simulations have demonstrated the feasibility of implementing the
models in recurrent networks of biophysically realistic neurons
[11,12,13,14,15]. As Ratcliff and McKoon [16] have recently
observed: ‘‘It has probably not been realized in the wider scientific
community that the class of diffusion models has as near to
provided a solution to simple decision making as is possible in
behavioral science.’’
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classes of behavioral data, neurophysiologists have naturally
employed these models to examine the neural mechanisms
underlying simple forms of decision-making. Hanes and Schall
[17] showed that a diffusion model accounts well for variability in
saccadic reaction times measured in monkeys performing a
countermanding task, and more impressively, they demonstrated
that the underlying signals measured from single neurons in the
frontal eye field are well described by the drift rate variable, but
poorly described by the threshold variable, of an underlying
diffusion process. This initial finding led to a substantial body of
work suggesting that diffusion models account well for the neural
mechanisms underlying saccade generation in several contexts
[18].
Shadlen and colleagues opened a particularly rich vein of
research by applying accumulator models to study neural
mechanisms underlying the workhorse task of psychophysics—
the two-alternative, forced-choice (2AFC) sensory discrimination.
Using a discrimination of motion direction in which monkeys
indicate their decisions by making saccadic eye movements
[19,20], Shadlen and colleagues showed that a competing
accumulator model can account well for behavioral accuracy
and reaction time data, and they demonstrated that the dynamical
activity of single neurons in the lateral intraparietal area of
monkey cortex (LIP) is also well described by a noisy information
accumulation process [21,22,23,24,25]. Gold and Shadlen [21,26]
further suggested that LIP neurons combine accumulated sensory
information with additional sources of information (e.g. prior
probability and payoffs) to form decision variables that are
monotonically related to the log of the likelihood ratio of choosing
one alternative versus the other, and are thus ideally suited for
guiding decisions about where to move the eyes. These models
postulate that separate populations of neurons in LIP correspond
to accumulators that encode a quantity proportional to the log
likelihood ratio associated with each of the two alternatives.
Hanks, Dietterich and Shadlen [27] subsequently obtained
microstimulation data consistent with the idea that LIP activity
is not merely correlative, but plays a causal role in these decisions.
Importantly, Ratcliff and colleagues have shown that ‘‘build-up’’
neurons in the superior colliculus exhibit very similar properties
during a 2AFC discrimination, raising the possibility that
accumulation of information into a decision variable is accom-
plished by a distributed network of neural circuits within
oculomotor planning structures [28,29].
These findings raised the intriguing question of whether the role
of LIP in decision-making is specific to the accumulation of
sensory information, or whether, in the spirit of signal detection
theory, LIP incorporates a broader range of inputs known to
influence behavioral decisions. The answer to this question has
proven to be emphatically affirmative. LIP activity is now known
to reflect numerous variables relevant to behavioral decisions,
including the prior probability that a particular eye movement will
be instructed [30], the probability of obtaining a reward during
foraging or competitive games [30,31,32,33,34], addition and
subtraction of probabilistic quantities [35,36], the internal
confidence associated with a sensory decision [36], and—
remarkably—the social value of ethologically powerful stimuli
which can override the intrinsic appeal of liquid rewards to a
thirsty animal [37].
Somewhat surprisingly, the emerging model of LIP computa-
tion has not yet been tested by manipulating payoffs in the context
of a sensory discrimination task. Payoffs, like prior probabilities,
are known to bias choices in near-threshold discrimination tasks,
and this effect can be easily incorporated into the likelihood ratio
to create a payoff-weighted likelihood function [2,21,26]. Further-
more, the effects of payoff information on discrimination accuracy
and reaction times are well described by drift diffusion models that
postulate a two-stage accumulation process—an initial stage of
accumulation about the payoffs followed by a second stage of
accumulation of sensory information [1,38,39]. In the two-stage
model, the initial accumulation of payoff information sets the
starting point of the diffusion process that accumulates sensory
information, a postulate that is well supported by fits to the
behavioral data. In contrast to the strong effect of payoff
information on starting point, fits to the behavioral data indicated
that payoff information had little or no effect on the drift rate of
the diffusion process.
Our primary goal in this paper is to examine the effect of
explicit payoff information on the activity of LIP neurons while
monkeys perform a 2AFC perceptual discrimination task. It is
known that LIP neurons are sensitive to the magnitude of a reward
associated with a visual cue or an eye movement target [30,40,41],
but it is not known how LIP processes sensory and reward signals
when the animal must balance the two (sometimes conflicting)
sources of information in making decisions. We therefore trained
two rhesus monkeys to perform the classic random dot motion
discrimination task in which the perceived direction of motion is
indicated by a saccadic eye movement to one of two visual targets
corresponding to the two possible directions of coherent motion
[19,20]. The important modification was that the size of the
reward for a correct response to each of the two possible directions
of motion was manipulated (single vs. double reward). Reward
magnitude for each alternative was cued in advance by the color of
the saccade target corresponding to each possible choice. Unequal
rewards led to a choice bias in favor of the more highly rewarded
target, and analysis of the behavioral data demonstrated that the
induced choice bias was nearly optimal for maximizing overall
reward rate [42].
To determine how sensory and reward information are
integrated at the cellular level, we recorded from single neurons
in LIP while the monkeys performed this task. Our analyses were
designed to address four questions, the first two descriptive and last
two mechanistic: 1) Are reward and sensory information
integrated at the level of single neurons, and if so, in what
proportions and with what dynamics? 2) Are individual LIP
neurons influenced only by the reward value of the target in the
response field, or do they also reflect the reward associated with
the alternative target, so that they can reflect relative as well as
absolute reward magnitude [32,34,35]? 3) Are the dynamics of
LIP activity consistent with a two-stage diffusion model as
proposed by Diederich and Bussmeyer [1]? 4) Does payoff
information affect the starting point of the sensory accumulation
process in LIP as suggested by the model of Diederich and
Bussmeyer, or does its influence accumulate gradually along with
the accumulation of sensory information (drift rate)? Our data
address each of these questions, thereby shedding new light on the
neural basis of oculomotor decisions and the relationship of neural
activity to formal models of decision-making.
Methods
Subjects and Ethics Statement
Two adult male rhesus monkeys, A and T (12 and 14 kg), were
trained on a two-alternative, forced-choice, motion discrimination
task with multiple reward contingencies. Daily access to fluids was
controlled during training and experimental periods to pro-
mote behavioral motivation. Before training, the monkeys were
prepared surgically with a head-holding device [43] and a scleral
Decision Signals in LIP
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 February 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 2 | e9308search coil for monitoring eye position [44]. All surgical,
behavioral, and animal care procedures complied with National
Institutes of Health guidelines and were approved by the Stanford
University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Ethical
standards incorporated into these guidelines and into our routine
laboratory procedures include a psychological enrichment pro-
gram, frequent contact with other animals (visual, auditory,
olfactory and, where appropriate, touch and grooming), regular
veterinary supervision and care, and pharmacological ameliora-
tion of pain associated with surgeries.
A Motion Discrimination Task with Multiple Reward
Contingencies
On each behavioral trial the monkeys observed a noisy random-
dot motion stimulus and reported which of two possible directions
of motion were present by making a saccadic eye movement to one
of two targets. The motion stimulus was composed of dynamic
random dots, viewed through a circular aperture on a dark
computer screen. On each trial a variable proportion of the dots
moved coherently in one of two opposite directions while the
remaining dots were flashed transiently at random locations and
times (for a detailed description see [45,46,47]). The difficulty of
the discrimination was varied parametrically from trial-to-trial by
adjusting the percentage of dots in coherent motion: the task was
easy if most of the dots moved coherently (e.g. 50% or 100%
coherence), but became progressively more difficult as the
coherence decreased.
Importantly, the coherence only describes the strength of the
motion, not its direction. In the data figures that follow, the ‘‘sign’’
of the coherence indicates the direction of coherent motion. Thus
+25% coherence and –25% coherence are equally strong motion
signals, but move in opposite directions. Typically, the animals
viewed a range of signed coherences spanning psychophysical
threshold. The animals were always rewarded for indicating the
correct direction of motion, except at 0% coherence where they
were rewarded randomly (50% probability) irrespective of their
choice.
Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events comprising a typical
trial of the motion discrimination task. From left to right, trials
began with the onset of a small dot that the monkey was required
to fixate for 150 ms. Next, two saccade targets (hollow gray circles)
appeared for 250 ms. The two targets were 10 degrees eccentric
from the visual fixation point and 180 degrees apart from each
other. The targets were positioned in-line with the axis of motion
being discriminated. By convention, the target corresponding to
positive coherence is target 1 (T1) while the other is target 2 (T2).
Target 1 was placed in the response field of the LIP neuron under
study (see below), while target 2 was placed in the opposite
hemifield.
After 250 ms the targets changed color, indicating the
magnitude of reward available to the monkey for correctly
choosing that target. A blue target indicated a low magnitude
(L) reward (1 unit, ,0.12 ml of juice), while a red target indicated
a high magnitude (H) reward (2 units). As there are two reward
magnitudes (H and L) to be assigned to each of two target
locations (T1 and T2), there were four reward conditions overall,
schematized by the vertical row of panels in Figure 1: 1) the LL
condition in which both targets were blue, 2) the HH condition in
which both targets were red, 3) the HL condition, in which T1 was
red and T2 was blue, and 4) the LH condition which was the
mirror of the HL condition.
The colored targets were visible for 250 ms before onset of the
visual motion stimulus, which appeared for 500 ms, centered on
the fixation point. Following offset of the motion stimulus, the
monkey was required to maintain fixation for a variable delay
period (300–550 ms) after which the fixation point disappeared,
cueing the monkey to report his decision with a saccade to the
target corresponding to the perceived direction of motion. If the
monkey chose the correct direction of motion, he received the
reward indicated by the color of the chosen target.
Fixation was enforced throughout the trial by requiring the
monkey to maintain its eye position within an electronic window
(1.25 degrees radius) centered on the fixation point. Inappropriate
breaks of fixation were punished by aborting the trial and
Figure 1. A two-alternative, forced-choice, motion discrimination task with multiple reward contingencies; sequence of events
comprising a typical trial. From left to right, trials begin with the onset of a fixation point. Two saccade targets appear and then change color
indicating the magnitude of the reward available for correctly choosing that target. A blue target indicates a low magnitude (L) reward, while a red
target indicates a high magnitude (H) reward. The four reward conditions are depicted vertically—LL,HH, LH and HL, from top to bottom. The visual
motion stimulus is centered on the fixation point. Following offset of the motion stimulus, the monkey maintains fixation during a variable delay
period after which the fixation point disappears, cueing the monkey to report his decision with a saccade to the target corresponding to the
perceived direction of motion. If the monkey chooses the correct direction of motion, he receives the reward indicated by the color of the chosen
target.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g001
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Psychophysical decisions were identified by detecting the time of
arrival of the monkeys’ eye in one of two electronic windows (1.25
radius) centered on the two choice targets (T1 and T2).
All trials were presented pseudo-randomly in block-randomized
order. For monkey A, we employed 12 signed coherences, 0%
coherence and four reward conditions, yielding 52 conditions
overall. For monkey T we eliminated four of the lowest motion
coherences because this animal’s sensitivity to the motion stimulus
was somewhat lower than monkey A’s. Thus monkey T was tested
for 36 conditions overall. We attempted to acquire 40 trials for
each condition, enabling us to characterize a full psychometric
function for each of the four reward conditions. Because these
behavioral data were obtained simultaneously with electrophysi-
ological recordings, however, we did not always acquire the full 40
trials for each condition (the experiment typically ended when
single unit isolation was lost). For the data reported in this paper,
the number of repetitions obtained for each experiment ranged
from 8 to 40 with a mean of 36.
The full data set analyzed in this paper consists of 33 behavioral
sessions from monkey A and 24 sessions from monkey T. Multiple
LIP neurons were sometimes recorded simultaneously—either
from multiple electrodes or a single electrode (see below)—yielding
a total of 51 LIP neurons from monkey A, and 31 from monkey T.
Procedures
During both training and experimental sessions monkeys sat in a
primate chair at a viewing distance of 57 cm from a color monitor.
Visual stimuli were presented on the monitor under computer
control. The monkeys’ heads were positioned stably using the head-
holding device, and eye position was monitored throughout all
experimental sessions by means of a magnetic search coil apparatus
(0.1u resolution; CNC Engineering, Seattle, WA).
Area LIP was identified by a combination of stereotactic
location, characteristic physiological activity and anatomical
magnetic resonance imaging. Single neurons were isolated and
their activity recorded with extracellular microelectrodes. Monkey
T received a single craniotomy that matched the dimensions of the
recording cylinder. For monkey A, the cylinder was placed on
intact skull protected with a thin layer of dental acrylic. For this
animal, a 3 mm ‘‘burr-hole’’ was drilled, under surgical condi-
tions, one day before beginning recordings at a given location
within the recording cylinder.
For monkey A, neurophysiological recording was accomplished
with quartz/platinum-tungsten electrodes (Thomas Recording,
Giessen, Germany) that were positioned and manipulated daily
with a 5-channel single electrode system (‘‘Mini Matrix,’’ Thomas
Recording, Giessen, Germany). Recordings were typically made
with two to four electrodes. For monkey T, we employed tungsten
electrodes (FHC Inc., Bowdoin, Maine) positioned with a Crist
grid (Crist Instruments Co., Inc., Hagerstown, Maryland) and
manipulated with a Narishige single electrode drive (Narishige
Co., LTD, East Meadow, New York). Multiple neurons were
recorded simultaneously in 13 experiments for monkey A, and in 6
experiments for monkey T. In these experiments target 1 was
positioned so as to activate all response fields (simultaneous
recordings were only carried out if the response fields overlapped
substantially). When multiple neurons were recorded, spikes were
sorted and clustered off-line, based on a principle component
analysis of the resulting voltage waveforms using the Plexon off-
line sorter (Plexon Inc., Dallas, Texas).
Behavioral control and data acquisition were managed by a PC-
compatible computer running the REX software environment
[48] and QNX Software System’s (Ottawa, Canada) real-time
operating system. Visual stimuli were generated using a VSG
graphics card (Cambridge Graphics, UK) and presented on a
CRT display. After amplification, single unit spiking activity was
identified and collected along with digitized task events and eye
position traces using the Plexon (Plexon Inc., Dallas, Texas) data
acquisition system operating in conjunction with Rex. All data
were subsequently analyzed offline with custom scripts written in
the MATLAB (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts)
programming language, running on Apple computers (Apple
Computer, Inc., Cupertino, California).
Cell Selection
We selected for study LIP neurons that exhibited persistent delay-
period activity during a delayed saccade task. Informal observations
in prior studies indicate a strong correlation between this property
and ‘‘choice predictive’’ activity in the motion discrimination task
[49,50]. Neurons with persistent activity in the delayed saccade task
comprised roughly a third of all LIP neurons encountered. We
employed a variant of the delayed saccade task that has been used
extensively to identify these neurons. Each trial began with the onset
of a small fixation target. After the monkey acquired and fixated the
target for 150 ms, a single saccade target appeared for a variable
delay period (250–800 ms). At the end of the delay period the fixation
point disappeared, cueing the monkey to saccade to the target.
Completed trials wereidentified bydetecting the time of arrival of the
monkey’s eye in an electronic window (1.25 radius) centered on the
target. The saccade target was typically presented in pseudorandom
order at six locations—10 degrees eccentric and separated by equal
polar angles. Eccentricities and angles were sometimes varied to
locate the sensitive region of a given neuron’s RF.
Analysis of Psychophysical Data
We fitted psychophysical data with a logistic regression model
that describes the log-odds-ratio of choosing T1 as a function of
















Where p is the observed probability of choosing T1, and bcoh, bt1
and bt2 are the fit coefficients representing the effects of motion
coherence and target values on this probability (the superscripts, b,
indicate coefficients for behavioral data, as opposed to physiolog-
ical data in Equation 3 below). b0 represents any global bias the
monkey has towards choosing T1. COH is the coherence of the
motion stimulus, in fractional units of the maximum coherence
employed and signed to signify the direction as described above.
Thus, COH ranges from -1 to 1, where -1 represents 248%
coherence and +1 represents +48% coherence. T1val and T2val are
assigned either +1, if the target was H, or 21 if the target was L.
For example, on HL trials in which the motion coherence was
212%, COH =20.25, T1val =+1 and T2val =21. Constraining
these factors to be in the same range (21 to 1) allows us to
compare directly the values of the fit coefficients.
Equation 1 can be rearranged to Equation 2, which was used to
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For each neuron, electrophysiological data were analyzed by
means of a multi-variable, linear regression model:
Equation 3:
FR t ðÞ ~b0 t ðÞ zbcoh t ðÞ COHzbt1 t ðÞ T1valzbt2 t ðÞ T2val
zbchoice t ðÞ CHOICE
where FR(t) is the mean firing rate over a given temporal epoch
and trial, and bcoh, bt1 and bt2 and bchoice are fit coefficients
representing the effects of motion coherence, target values and
choice on firing rate. As with the analysis of psychophysical data,
COH is the coherence of the motion stimulus on that trial, in
fractional units of the maximum coherence employed and signed
to signify the direction of motion. Similarly, T1val and T2val are
assigned either +1, if the target was H, or 21 if the target was L.
Choice is assigned a value of +1 for T1 choices and 21 for T2
choices. As with the psychophysical analysis, constraining these
factors to be in the same range (21 to 1) allows us to compare
directly the values of the fit coefficients and determine which have
greater impact on FR. Note that Equation 3 is very similar to
Equation 1 with the addition of a factor for behavioral choice.
Equation 3 was fit to the average firing rate for each neuron in
sliding 50 msec time windows.
To ensure that the effects on firing rate of coherence, target value
and choice (equation 3) did not arise artifactually from subtle
variationsintheoperantsaccades,wealsofitalldatawitharegression





The latency, amplitude, accuracy, maximum speed and duration
of the saccade are represented respectively by LAT, AMP, ACC,
VMAX and DUR.
Figure 2. Relative reward biases choice. A–D. Psychometric functions (PMFs) describing each monkey’s probability of choosing T1 as a function
of motion coherence. Motion coherence is denoted with a magnitude indicating the strength of the motion and a sign indicating its direction.
Positive coherence denotes motion towards T1 while negative coherence denotes motion towards T2. Separate PMFs are plotted for each reward
condition (HH, red; LL, blue; HL, black; LH, green). Circles depict the observed proportion of T1 choices, and sigmoidal curves are fit quantitatively
with logistic regression. A–B. Results from one representative experiment for monkey A and monkey T, respectively. C–D. Average PMFs across all
behavioral sessions for monkeys A (n=33) and T (n=24), respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g002
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accumulation of sensory information by LIP neurons, we assessed
the rate of the increase in neural activity during the motion epoch
for each LIP neuron, generally following the procedure of Kiani
and Shadlen [36]. For each neuron, we first identified the well
known ‘‘dip’’ in LIP activity that follows the onset of motion
stimulus (see Figs. 3–5, first half of the motion epoch). We
calculated the mean peristimulus-time histogram (PSTH) of neural
activity for all correct T1 choices and considered the ‘‘dip’’ to be
the point of minimum activity between 50 ms and 300 ms after
stimulus onset. After identifying the time of the dip, we then
calculated for each reward condition the average rate of rise (or
fall) of neural activity between the dip and 1) the end of the motion
epoch, or 2) the point at which average firing rate saturated—
whichever came first. For neurons whose firing rate saturated
before the end of the motion epoch, we considered the point of
saturation to be the time at which the maximum firing rate was
achieved. We define the slope of the accumulation process to be
the best linear fit to the PSTH during this measurement window.
To obtain temporally independent data for this analysis, the
average firing rate during the measurement window was
calculated in 50 msec bins with no overlap.
The central goal of the slope calculation was to compare the
average rate of rise of LIP firing rates for the four reward
conditions, while factoring out any contribution of behavioral
choice or the motion stimulus itself (signed coherence). We
eliminated possible effects of choice by analyzing only trials that
ended in T1 choices, as indicated above. We neutralized the effects
of stimulus strength by conducting the analysis in the following
steps. 1) For each trial, we offset the ‘firing rate vs. time’ trace so
Figure 3. LIP represents the absolute value of the option in the RF. A. Average data from monkey A (n=51 cells). B. Average data from
monkey T (n=31 cells). Mean LIP firing rate as a function of time, for the HH (red) and LL (blue) reward conditions. Data are plotted separately for T1
(solid) and T2 (dashed) choices. 0–250 ms is the target epoch in which the blank targets are presented; 250–500 ms is the reward epoch in which the
targets change color to cue the reward condition; 500–1000 ms is the motion epoch in which the random-dot motion stimulus is presented; 1000–
1250 ms is the early segment of the delay epoch; 2350–0 ms (in the right panel) is the late delay epoch immediately preceding the saccade. Any
difference between the red and blue curves indicates an effect of the absolute value of the option in the RF.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g003
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the measurement window (defined above) are calculated relative to
the firing rate at the dip. 2) For each neuron, for all trials at a given
signed coherence level, the firing rate in each 50 msec bin was
normalized to the maximum firing rate (relative to the dip)
observed in any single bin on any trial during the measurement
window. 3) For each signed coherence level, normalized firing
rates were averaged within time bins across trials. Averages were
calculated separately for the four reward conditions. 4) For each
reward condition, normalized firing rates were averaged across all
positive coherence levels to obtain, for each neuron, a normalized,
reward-condition-specific PSTH. (T1 choices were relatively rare
at negative coherences, and we therefore omitted negative
coherences from the average to avoid measurement noise resulting
from small numbers of trials.) 5) For each neuron, the slope of the
PSTH was measured for each reward condition during the
measurement window. 6) Statistical tests were performed to
identify differences in slopes between reward conditions across the
population (see Discussion). 7) For each reward condition,
normalized firing rates were then averaged across neurons to
obtain an average PSTH for the entire population of neurons for
each animal.
Results
‘‘Relative Value’’ Biases Choice
Figures 2A–D illustrate psychometric functions (PMFs) depict-
ing the observed proportion of T1 choices as a function of signed
motion coherence. A separate PMF is plotted for each of the four
reward conditions: high-high (HH; large rewards available for
both targets), low-low (LL; small rewards available for both
targets), high-low (HL; large reward for target 1 and small reward
Figure 4. LIP represents the relative value of the option in the RF. A. Average data from monkey A (n=51 cells). B. Average data from
monkey T (n=31 cells). Mean LIP firing rate as a function of time, for the HH (red) and HL (black) reward conditions. HH curves are the same as in
Figure 3A–B. Data are plotted separately for T1 (solid) and T2 (dashed) choices. In the left panels, responses are aligned to the target onset, while in
the right panels, responses are aligned to the saccade time. Any difference between the red and black curves indicates an effect of the relative value
of the option in the RF.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g004
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sigmoidal curves are logistic regression fits to the observed data
(Methods). Figures 2A and 2B depict data from a representative
experiment for monkey A and monkey T respectively. Figures 2C
and 2D depict the average PMF across all behavioral sessions for
monkeys A (n=33) and T (n=24) respectively.
Two features of the data in Figure 2 are notable. First, the PMFs
for the unbalanced reward conditions are shifted horizontally with
respect to the balanced conditions, revealing a systematic choice
bias for the larger reward. Both monkeys chose T1 more
frequently when it was associated with a high reward relative to
T2 (black symbols and lines), and chose T2 more frequently for the
converse condition (green symbols and lines). Second, the observed
behavior for the balanced conditions (HH and LL reward
conditions—red and blue circles, respectively) is nearly identical,
indicating that the monkey’s probability of choosing T1 is
unaffected by changes in the absolute size of the reward. One
might have expected the PMFs to steepen for the HH condition if
the monkeys were motivated by the larger rewards to discriminate
the motion stimulus more carefully. Instead, both monkeys appear
to discriminate as well as they possibly can for both conditions,
suggesting a high baseline level of motivation throughout the
experiments. Both monkeys, however, were significantly more
likely to break fixation during LL trials as compared to HH trials
(LL trials: monkey A, 2.73%+/20.13; monkey T, 3.19+/20.35;
HH trials: monkey A, 1.77%+/20.12; monkey T, 1.66%+/20.27;
two-sample t-test, monkey A, p,10‘-4, monkey T, p,0.002).
For both monkeys, average behavior across all experiment
sessions (Fig. 2C,D) was very similar to the individual session
examples (Fig. 2A,B). Thus the effects of coherence and reward
Figure 5. A second look at the relative value effect. A. Average data from monkey A (n=51 cells). B. Average data from monkey T (n=31 cells).
Mean LIP firing rate as a function of time, for the LL (blue) and LH (green) reward conditions. LL curves are the same as in Figure 3A–B. Data are
plotted separately for T1 (solid) and T2 (dashed) choices. In the left panels, responses are aligned to the target onset, while in the right panels,
responses are aligned to the saccade time. Any difference between the blue and green curves indicates an effect of the relative value of the option in
the RF.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g005
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and across the data sets for the two monkeys. As we have reported
previously [42], the observed choice biases are nearly optimal in
terms of maximizing reward collection across an experimental
session. On average, both monkeys harvested rewards at ,98% of
the theoretical maximum given their underlying psychophysical
sensitivity to the motion stimulus.
The Representation of Choice, Absolute Value, and
Relative Value in LIP
Our analysis of LIP activity during this task revealed three
primary effects that varied dynamically over the course of a typical
trial: 1) the well known effect of decision outcome (choice),
particularly in the later stages of the trial, 2) an effect of the
‘‘absolute value’’ of the target in the neuron’s RF (T1) irrespective
of the value of T2, and 3) an effect of the ‘‘relative value’’ of the
target in the neuron’s RF (whether it was larger than, smaller than,
or equal to the value of T2). In the following three sections, we will
illustrate each of these effects and its dynamics qualitatively by
inspection of average PSTH’s for each monkey. In the fourth
section we will analyze these effects quantitatively by means of a
multiple regression analysis.
As described in Methods, we always positioned one response
target (T1) within the RF of the neuron under study, while
positioning the other target (T2) 180u away in the opposite
hemifield. The axis of stimulus motion was defined by these two
target positions so that motion discrimination choices correspond-
ed to saccades into or out of the RF. In the following sections, we
denote choices into the RF as ‘‘T1 choices’’ and those to the
opposite target as ‘‘T2 choices’’.
Representation of Choice: Qualitative Description
Figures 3A (monkey A) and 3B (monkey T) depict mean LIP
firing rate as a function of time for all successfully completed trials
in the HH (red) and LL (blue) reward conditions. Data are plotted
separately for trials in which the monkey chose T1 (solid lines) and
T2 (dashed lines). Both 3A and 3B consist of two panels: a left
panel with responses aligned to the time of target onset and a right
panel (labeled ‘‘late delay epoch’’) with responses aligned to the
time of the saccade. The black vertical lines in both figures denote
relevant task epochs.
Note first that in both 3A and 3B, the solid and dashed lines are
initially identical (for each color), but diverge approximately
200 ms into the motion period. Thus, shortly after the onset of the
motion stimulus, LIP neurons in both monkeys begin to signal
choice—whether the monkey will choose T1 or T2. This result is
not surprising. We explicitly selected for study neurons that
responded differentially to oppositely directed eye movements in
the delayed saccade task, and it is well known from previous work
that such LIP neurons typically exhibit ‘‘choice predictive’’ activity
during a variety of forced-choice tasks [30,49,51]. The data in
Figure 3 demonstrate that this property of LIP neurons holds for a
task in which decisions are based on a combination of visual
motion and reward information. The effect of behavioral choice in
the LIP data is robust, consistent across neurons and monkeys, and
present for all four reward conditions as demonstrated below.
An unanticipated difference between the two monkeys was the
absence of an initial visual ‘‘burst’’ in monkey T. The burst was
absent during the delayed saccade task as well (data not shown).
Although LIP neurons lacking the visual burst have been observed
by our lab and others previously, we have never recorded from a
monkey in which the burst appeared to be absent across the
population. We do not believe this result is due to oversampling
from a few unusual locations in LIP; our recordings sites were
reasonably widely distributed along the lateral bank of the
intraparietal sulcus. While this appears to be a genuine difference
between the monkeys, it does not affect any of our key results
pertaining to the accumulation of motion information or the
influence of reward condition on LIP activity since these results are
present in both monkeys.
Representation of Absolute Value: Qualitative
Description
Any differences in neural activity between the HH and LL
conditions indicate an effect of absolute reward value since the
relative reward value (compared to the value of T2) is identical in
the two conditions. By comparing the red and blue lines in Figure 3
we can see the extent to which LIP represents absolute reward
value. Consider first the data from monkey A in Figure 3A. The
solid red and blue traces (T1 choices) separate with very short
latency following presentation of the reward cues at 250 ms. Thus
the LIP population rapidly encodes the absolute value of T1,
producing elevated firing rates when a high value target is
presented within the RF. Following their initial separation, the red
and blue traces converge briefly near the beginning of the motion
epoch, but then separate again for the duration of the trial.
Qualitatively, then, except for a brief interval near the onset of the
motion stimulus, LIP neurons from monkey A encode a signal
concerning the absolute value of the reward available in the RF
throughout the trial. Note that this representation of absolute
value is present for T2 choices as well (dashed traces).
Figure 3B shows a similar pattern of activity for the LIP
population recorded from monkey T. Even though LIP activity in
monkey T does not respond as rapidly or robustly as in monkey A,
all major features of the absolute value signal observed in monkey
A are replicated in monkey T: 1) the effect of absolute value begins
during the reward cue period, 2) greater absolute value is
represented by higher firing rates, 3) the effect is maintained until
the end of the trial and 4) the effect is present for T2 choice trials
as well. A minor difference is that the absolute reward signal does
not ‘‘disappear’’ at any point in the trial for monkey T. It is
interesting that absolute reward value exerts a substantial effect on
LIP activity even though it exerts little if any effect on choice
(Fig. 2). We will consider this point further in the simulations and
in the Discussion.
Representation of Relative Value: Qualitative Description
As revealed by the behavioral data, the relative reward value of
the two targets exerts a substantial impact on choice behavior. We
first examine the effect of relative value on LIP by comparing
neuronal responses in the HH and HL reward conditions. In these
conditions, the value of T1 is constant (high value) while the value
of T2 differs (high in HH, low in HL). Thus, any LIP modulation
between these two conditions indicates a relative effect of T2 value
on the response to the high value target present in the RF.
Figures 4A and 4B depict LIP responses for monkeys A and T,
respectively, to the HH (red traces) and HL (black traces) reward
conditions. The format of these figures is identical to Figures 3A
and 3B, and the red curves are the same as in Figure 3.
In Figure 4A, the black and red traces separate late in the
reward cue epoch, with the average firing rate being higher for the
HL condition (arrow). This difference indicates that on average,
LIP neurons respond more strongly to a target in the RF (T1)
when it has a larger value relative to that of the T2 target. This
‘‘relative value’’ signal is present throughout most of the motion
epoch but disappears early in the delay epoch, after the choice has
presumably been determined. The same dynamics are evident
both for T1 and T2 choices (solid and dashed lines, respectively).
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from monkey T, illustrated in Figure 4B. As for monkey A, the
relative reward signal emerges late in the reward cue epoch (black
arrow), with average firing rate being higher for larger relative
value. For monkey T, however, the relative reward signal fades
more rapidly than for monkey A. Additionally, for T1 choices, the
relative reward signal inverts during the second half of the motion
epoch and remains inverted throughout the delay epoch. This
inversion is not present for T2 choices, however.
We can acquire a second look at the effects of relative reward by
comparing the LL and LH reward conditions. As in the previous
comparison of HH and HL trials, the value of T1 is identical (low)
for the LL and LH conditions. The two conditions differ only in
the value of T1 relative to the value of T2, which is equal in the LL
condition but low in the LH condition. Again, any modulation of
LIP activity between these two conditions comprises a signal of
relative reward value.
Figures 5A and 5B compare average LIP responses in the LL
(blue traces) and LH (green traces) conditions for monkeys A and
T, respectively. Note that the blue curves in these figures are the
same as the blue curves in Figures 3A and 3B. The data for
monkey A show an effect of relative reward similar to that seen in
Figure 4A. The green trace drops below the blue trace during the
reward cue epoch (black arrow), indicating again that average LIP
firing rates fall as the relative value of the target in the RF
decreases. The green and blue traces converge again during the
motion period and remain together throughout the delay period,
indicating a diminished representation of relative reward. As
shown in Figure 5B, the effect of relative reward is similar,
although weaker, in monkey T (black arrow).
Quantifying LIP Dynamics: Absolute Value, Relative
Value, Motion Coherence and Choice
As is evident from the qualitative evaluation above, LIP
population responses are highly dynamic, representing behavior-
ally relevant variables to differing degrees at different times during
the trial. To quantify these trends we applied a multiple-variable,
linear regression model to LIP activity over a sliding temporal
window as described in Methods. For each LIP neuron we applied
the model (equation 3) to the average firing rate over a 50 ms
window that was progressively slid, in 1 ms intervals, across the
duration of a trial. This generated a time vector of coefficients
(bcoh, bt1 and bt2 and bchoice) for each neuron describing the
influence of each factor on the mean firing rate at successive time
points. Because the values of the different variables were scaled
appropriately (21t o+1), comparison of the coefficients provides
an accurate comparison of the effects of each variable on the firing
rate of LIP neurons.
Figures 6A and 6B plot the mean regression coefficients (6
s.e.m.) across neurons, for bcoh (black), bt1 (red), bt2 (blue) and
bchoice (green) as a function of time for monkeys A and T
respectively. The same basic trends are evident in the two
monkeys, although the coefficients are smaller and more variable
in monkey T. The smaller coefficients in monkey T result from the
lower overall firing rate modulation (see Figs. 3–5); the greater
variance results partly from the smaller sample size (monkey A:
n=51; monkey T: n=31) and partly from greater intrinsic
variability between neurons in this animal.
The quantitative data confirm the general impressions derived
from qualitative inspection of the averagefiringrates inFigures 3–5.
The first variables to be reflected in the dynamics of LIP firing rates
are the absolute reward value of the target in the RF (bt1) and the
value of the target outside the RF (bt2), which indicates the effect of
‘‘relative reward’’ on firing rate. The effect of T1 value (red curve)
rises with very short latency (,100 msec for monkey T; even faster
for monkey A);the effect of T2 value (blue curve) arisesmore slowly,
but is clearly present in both animals by the time of onset of the
motion stimulus. The sign of bt2 is predominantly negative because
a high reward value for T2 decreases the probability of a T1 choice,
and thus decreases the firing rate of the LIP neuron. For both
animals, a small but significant reversal in the sign of bt2 is present
later in the trial—during the delay period for monkey A and late in
the motion period for monkey T. Notably, both data sets also
exhibit a significant but small effect of bt1 (absolute reward)
throughout the delay period, in contrast to the report of Dorris and
Glimcher [32]. This is a significant observationthat we will consider
further in the Discussion.
Following onset of the motion stimulus, the effects of motion
coherence (bcoh, gray curve) and behavioral choice (bchoice, green
curve) arise—essentially simultaneously given the time resolution
of our analysis—with a latency of approximately 200–250 msec, as
reported previously [22,49,51,52]. Thus the decision appears to
begin forming in the system as soon as evidence about the direction
of stimulus motion is present in LIP. Interestingly, the effect of
motion coherence abates near the end of the motion period and is
completely absent during the delay period. Under the conditions of
our experiment, therefore, information about stimulus seems to be
discarded once the decision is formed, consistent with previous
observations by Roitman and Shadlen ([22]; their Figs. 7B and 7C).
As the effects of coherence and target value diminish during the
delay period, the effect of choice continues to grow, reaching its
peak immediately before the operant saccade. For both monkeys,
the peak effects of choice near the end of the trial are nearly equal to
the peak effects of absolute value near the beginning.
Quantitatively, our coherence effects, although highly signifi-
cant, are smaller than those reported in previous studies of LIP.
Shadlen and Newsome [49] reported that a range of coherence
from 0% to 51.2% modulated LIP activity by 2.7 spikes/sec for T1
choices and 4.2 spikes/sec for T2 choices. Based on our regression
model of LIP activity (Equation 3; bcoh), we calculate that the
range of coherences employed in our study (0%–48%) modulated
LIP activity by 2.0 spikes/sec in monkey A and by 0.78 spikes/sec
in monkey T. (Because we fit the data with a single model (eq. 3),
we did not obtain separate estimates for T1 and T2 choices).
Roitman and Shadlen [22] reported substantially larger modula-
tions for the same coherence range: 13.2 and 5.2 spikes per second
for T1 and T2 choices, respectively (their Fig. 7B).
Possible Effects of Eye Movements
The operant saccades to T1 or T2 targets can vary slightly from
trial to trial in latency, amplitude, velocity and accuracy. Thus it is
possible that these small variations in saccade parameters might
account for the change in neural response we have associated with
absolute value, relative value, and motion coherence. To assess this
possibility, we extended our linear regression model to incorporate
various parameters of the operant saccade. For each trial, we
calculated five parameters fromthe stored eye positiontraces: latency,
amplitude, accuracy, maximum speed and duration. We included
these factors, along with factors for absolute value, relative value,
motion coherence and choice, in an extended regression model given
by equation 4 (Methods). Wefitted this model, and the original model
as well (equation 3), separately to the mean firing rate during three
trial epochs: reward cue (250–500 ms), motion (500–1000 ms), and
late delay (1000–1550 ms). For all epochs in each monkey, the
average values of bcoh, bt1, bt2 and bchoice were unaffected by
inclusion of the saccade parameters in the regression model (paired
t-test, p.0.05).Coefficient values sometimes changed significantly for
individual experiments after including the saccade parameters in the
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could increase as well as decrease) and changes occurred rarely
(reward epoch bt1:4 . 8 7 % ,bt2: 3.65% of cells; motion epoch bt1:
4.87%, bt2:3 . 6 5 % ,bcoh: 6.09%, bchoice: 24.29% of cells; delay epoch
bt1: 7.35%, bt2: 10.9%, bcoh:1 . 2 1 % ,bchoice: 8.5% of cells). We
therefore conclude that variation in saccade metrics does not explain
the response modulation accompanying variations in T1 value, T2
value and motion coherence.
Do Individual LIP Neurons Integrate Sensory and Value
Information
The data in Figure 6 show that LIP neurons, on average, are
influenced simultaneously by several variables—absolute value,
relative value and motion coherence—and that the relative
influence of these variables changes dynamically during the trial.
The averaged data presented thus far, however, do not address the
issue of whether these variables are similarly mixed at the level of
single neurons, or whether population multiplexing emerges from
averaging across neurons which are individually more selective.
To address this issue, we analyzed data within the late motion
(750–1000 ms) and early delay epochs (1000–1300 ms) to
determine how many neurons exhibited significant regression
coefficients for one factor alone, any two factors, or all three
factors. Figure 7A–B depicts the results for the two epochs; data
from monkeys A and T are shown in blue and red, respectively. In
the late motion epoch a substantial number of neurons in both
monkeys were influenced by only one factor, but a roughly equal
number of neurons represented multiple factors simultaneously.
Figure 6. Quantifying the dynamics of absolute value, relative value, motion coherence and choice. A. Average regression coefficients
from monkey A. B. Same data for monkey T. Mean values (6sem) of bcoh (black), bt1 (red), bt2 (blue) and bchoice (green) coefficients as a function of
time. These coefficients represent the average effect of motion coherence, T1 value, T2 value, and choice on firing rate. They are fit by applying
Equation 3 to the average firing rate slid in 1 ms intervals across the duration of the trial. Window width =50 ms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g006
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by multiple factors. Evidently, the dynamic multiplexing of signals
in the average data is characteristic of single LIP neurons as well.
Relation to the Integrator/Accumulator Model of
Decision-Making
For the motion discrimination task with balanced rewards, both
psychophysical performance and neural activity in LIP have been
modeled by a process in which noisy information is integrated over
time [22,23,52]. In these models, temporally varying motion
information originating in visual area MT is accumulated by
competing pools of LIP neurons. In reaction time experiments, a
response is triggered when one of the accumulators reaches a
bound. In experiments in which the duration of the integration
period is fixed by the experimenter, as in the present study, two
possibilities have been discussed. According to the first [23,52], a
bound is still used, and the response is determined by the
accumulator that reaches the bound first. According to the second
(also considered by [11,12,15,23,42]) the state of the accumulators
continues to evolve until the go cue is presented, at which time the
accumulator with the largest activation is selected. We couch the
following discussion in terms of the first of these two possibilities,
returning to the second possibility below.
Applying the bounded integration model to the behavioral
paradigm of our experiment, as sketched in Figure 1, two pools of
LIP neurons, representing the leftward and rightward saccade
targets, would accumulate information from pools of leftward and
rightward direction selective neurons in MT. A decision would be
reached when the accumulated signal in one pool of LIP neurons
reaches the bound.
The accumulation process is schematized by the cartoon of
Figure 8A. This trace illustrates an idealized average firing rate for
one pool of LIP neurons under balanced reward conditions. LIP
activity departs from steady state shortly following the onset of the
motion stimulus (time 0), integrating incoming motion information
until a bound (dashed line) is reached. Under balanced reward
conditions, the two accumulators compete on equal footing (the
other accumulator is not shown), and the outcome of the decision
process is therefore determined by the relative strength of the
Figure 7. Reward and motion information are multiplexed at the single neuron level. The bars depict the percentage of neurons that are
modulated significantly by one, two or three model parameters: T1val,T 2 val or coherence. A. Data from the second half of the motion epoch. B. Data
from the early delay epoch. Red bars: monkey A. Blue bars: monkey B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g007
Figure 8. Possible mechanisms underlying the effect of
imbalanced payoffs on behavioral choice. A. Idealized LIP activity
as a function of time during the motion epoch for one spatial location.
Time zero indicates the initiation of the motion stimulus. In the model,
motion evidence supporting a decision accumulates until it reaches a
bound indicated by the dashed lines. B. ‘‘Two-stage’’ mechanism. In the
first stage, information about payoff size establishes the initial offset of
the accumulator, which, in the imbalanced payoff conditions (HL and
LH), is biased in favor of the spatial location of the high payoff target. In
the second stage, motion information accumulates to a fixed bound, as
in A. C. ‘‘Drift rate’’ mechanism. The accumulator offset is identical for
all payoff conditions, but payoff information is incorporated into the
drift rate of the accumulation process, again biasing the process in favor
of the high payoff target. D. Payoff information affects neither the
offset nor the drift rate, but rather exerts its effect through adjustment
of the decision bound. HL = high-low reward condition (large payoff
target in the LIP response field; small payoff target in the opposite
hemifield). LH = low-high reward condition (small payoff target in the
LIP response field).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g008
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variability in the sensory evidence and in the accumulation
process itself. In the unbalanced reward conditions (HL and LH),
decisions are biased strongly toward the higher value target (Fig. 2),
but the neural mechanisms underlying this behavioral bias are
unknown.
Figures 8B–D illustrate three possible mechanisms suggested by
Diederich and Bussmeyer [1] that could account for the choice
bias in the unbalanced reward conditions. The first possibility
(Fig. 8B) is that the reward cue produces an offset in the initial
value of the accumulator, granting a relative advantage to the
accumulator corresponding to the high value target. In the HL
condition, for example, the high value target is in the RF of the
LIP pool under study, and the offset is thus positive relative to the
other accumulator, which is in the LH condition (compare the
black and green traces). The accumulator with the positive offset
will therefore tend to reach the bound sooner, resulting in more
choices of the RF target in the HL condition. Conversely, the RF
target will be at a relative disadvantage in the LH condition (green
trace), resulting in more choices of the non-RF target. A second
possibility (Fig. 8C) is that the reward information has no effect on
the starting point of the accumulation process, but rather affects
the drift rate of the diffusion process by contributing an additional
input to the accumulator when the high value target is in the RF
(black trace) and/or a negative input to the accumulator when the
low value target is in the RF (green trace). An effect of payoff
information on drift rate would increase the slope of the
accumulator activation curve for the HL condition and/or
decrease the slope for the LH condition. Both effects would
increase the likelihood of a choice of the high value target. A third
possibility (Fig. 8D) is that the reward information affects the
bound, not the state of the accumulators. Thus the bound would
be lowered when the high value target is positioned in the RF (HL
bound, Fig. 8D) and raised when the low value target is in the RF.
These potential mechanisms, of course, are not mutually exclusive,
nor are they exhaustive.
Our LIP data allow us to evaluate contrasting predictions of the
first two candidate mechanisms. Figure 9 illustrates data from
monkey A and monkey T that are directly analogous to the
idealized traces for the HL and LH conditions in Figure 8B–C.
These data are for T1 choices and appeared previously in Figures 4
and 5; the key elements of the data are reproduced here for ease of
comparison, focusing on the motion presentation epoch (time
500–1000) when the accumulation process actually occurs. For
both monkeys, it is clear that the traces are offset with the expected
sign during the first 200 milliseconds of the motion epoch,
confirming the prediction of the ‘‘offset’’ mechanism illustrated in
Figure 8B.
The data in Figure 9 do not conform to the prediction of the
‘‘drift rate’’ mechanism in Figure 8C. In fact, the slope appears
shallower for the HL condition compared to the LH condition.
However, these traces are averaged across all motion coherences
for each animal (T1 choices only). The HL traces are thus
enriched in low coherence stimuli compared to the LH traces
because of the strong behavioral bias toward T1 choices in the HL
condition. In the LH condition, there are fewer T1 choices overall,
and these T1 choices tend to occur when the motion information
is sufficiently strong (high positive coherences) to override the
reward bias. Strong positive coherences will drive the accumula-
tion process more rapidly than weaker coherences, leading to the
slope effect observed in Figure 9.
To factor out the effect of coherence on the accumulation
slopes, we first normalized firing rates within each stimulus
condition (signed coherence) before averaging across trials to
Figure 9. Unbalanced rewards results in an offset to the starting point of the accumulation process. A. Average LIP firing rate (6sem) as
a function of time for the HL (black) and LH (green) reward conditions (monkey A, T1 choices only). Activity is averaged across all coherences. The
black and green curves are replotted from Figs. 4A and 5A (respectively), expanding the horizontal scale to emphasize the interval at and following
the onset of stimulus motion (time 500). B. Equivalent data for monkey T. Traces are replotted from Figs. 4B and 5B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g009
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To visualize the normalized data, we then averaged the resulting
PSTH’s for a given coherence across the population of neurons for
the HL and LH reward conditions. Figures 10A and 10B show the
results of this analysis for +48% coherence, which resulted in T1
choices on nearly every trial for both monkeys (Figs. 2C and 2D).
On the horizontal axis, the trials are aligned to the time of the ‘dip’
measured for each neuron (see Methods). On the vertical axis, all
firing rates begin at zero at the dip, as described in Methods. Thus
the curves illustrate the accumulation process for the HL (black)
and LH (green) reward conditions from the time of the dip to the
end of the measurement window (defined in Methods). The basic
result is clear and somewhat surprising, even though the data are
noisier for monkey T (due in part to the smaller number of
neurons contributing to the analysis). The traces for the two
reward conditions are indistinguishable for the first 200 millisec-
onds following the dip, contradicting the prediction of the drift rate
mechanism in Figure 8C. Similar trends are evident when the data
are averaged across all positive coherences as illustrated in
Figures 10C and 10D. The slope for HL still becomes shallower
than the slope for LH, but only toward the end of the motion
integration period. To confirm this impression statistically, we
measured the slope of the LIP PSTH’s in the HL and LH
conditions for each neuron, after averaging traces like those in
Figures 10A and 10B across all positive coherences for each cell
(see Methods). During the first 200 milliseconds following the dip,
there was no significant difference in the distribution of slopes in
the HL and LH conditions for either monkey (paired t-test,
p.0.05 for both monkeys). When slopes were calculated across the
entire motion integration period (as defined in Methods), however,
the distributions differed significantly between the HL and LH
conditions in both monkeys, with slopes being shallower in the HL
condition (paired t-test, p,0.002 for monkey A, p,0.02 for
monkey T).
The evidence in Figures 9 and 10 provides direct support for the
view that the hypothesized LIP accumulator starts higher in the
HL condition than in the LH condition, and that the drift rate of
the accumulators is initially unaffected by the reward condition. As
we shall discuss more fully below, the shallower slope for the HL
condition toward the end of the integration period is consistent
with the presence of an integration bound, which is reached
sooner in the HL than in the LH condition. With this
encouragement, we conducted mathematical analysis and simula-
tions that we now describe to determine whether a bounded
integration model can account for our experimental data—both
behavioral and physiological.
Mathematical Analysis and Simulation
For several reasons, the analysis above points toward a bounded
integration model, with relative reward affecting the starting point
Figure 10. Rate of accumulation for the unbalanced reward conditions. A–B. Normalized firing rates (6sem) for a single motion condition
(+48% coherence), averaged across the population of neurons from monkey A and monkey T, respectively. All data are from trials ending in a T1
choice. C–D. As in A–B, but averaged across all positive coherences. The HL condition is depicted in black, the LH condition in green. Time zero is the
time of the initial ‘‘dip’’ in firing rate following onset of the motion signal, identified separately for each neuron (see Methods).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g010
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immediate challenge to the bounded integration model. The
presence of the bound renders an integration process imperfect
because it limits the amount of information accumulated, and this
can produce distortion in the pattern of behavioral results. This
distortion is most obvious if we consider the HH vs. LL conditions
in the data for monkey A. These data indicate that the
accumulators start closer to the bound in HH than they do in
the LL condition. In that case, the bound is reached sooner on
average in the HH condition; less information is therefore
integrated, with the result that behavioral performance should
be less accurate. Yet there is no difference in the behavioral
performance between the HH and the LL conditions (Fig. 2).
To address this issue, we must consider two distinct possible
sources of variability in the decision process. The first of these—
and the one generally receiving the greater emphasis in the
literature—is moment-by-moment noise in the input to the
accumulators. Let us consider an accumulator model with two
accumulators racing to a decision bound. One can characterize
the input to each accumulator by the following simple equation:
Equation 5:
at ðÞ ~at {1 ðÞ za Czswg t ðÞ
where a(t) represents the activation of the accumulator at time t, a is
an integration rate parameter (it also indicates the sensitivity to
stimulus), C represents the coherence such that positive values excite
the accumulator, g(t) represents a sample of noise from the standard
normal distribution taken at time t, and sw is a scale factor
representing the standard deviation of the within-trial, moment-by-
moment noise in the integration process. For our case, we are
considering a situation in which there are two accumulators, one for
eachalternative.Equation5 appliestotheaccumulatorcorresponding
to the neuron recorded in the physiological experiment. For the other
accumulator, C is replaced by –C, so that values exciting one
accumulator are inhibiting the other. For such an accumulator model,
the distortions discussed above arise and preliminary simulations (not
shown) resulted in very poor fits to the behavioral data.
While some models include only the moment-by-moment
variability discussed above, others include a second source of
variability, namely between-trial variability in the strength of the
sensory evidence reaching the accumulators. This idea was first
employed by Ratcliff [5] in accounting for human behavioral data,
and has since been incorporated in many other models, including
the LATER model, which has been used to account for correlation
between the slope of activation in FEF and latency of eye
movement responses [18,53,54]. In our case, we capture between-
trial variability in the motion-dependent input signal to the
accumulators by assuming that the value of C is perturbed, for the
duration of a whole trial, by a sample from the standard normal
distribution scaled by sb (the between-trial standard deviation
parameter), so that the integration equation becomes:
Equation 6:
at ðÞ ~at {1 ðÞ zaC0zswg t ðÞ
where C’ = C +sbg, represents the perturbed value of C. For the other
accumulator we replace C’ with –C’, so that the same perturbation
affects the input to both accumulators. Importantly, we do not ascribe
this between-trial variability to any particular cortical area or
processing stage. It may originate in the motion output of MT (due,
for example, to the stochastic stimuli employed in these experiments)
or to any additional stage of the pathways linking MT to LIP.
A consequence of between-trial variability is that the accuracy of
the outcome of the information integration process is less dependent
on the duration of integration. It can be shown that the mean of the
accumulated sensory information is a simple linear function of t,
Equation 7:
m t ðÞ ~aCt
while the standard deviation in the accumulated information after
t seconds is given by
Equation 8:

















Two points follow from this equation. First, if between-trial
variability is high relative to within-trial variability, the signal-to-
noise ratio can easily be dominated by the between-trial variability.
Second, as time goes by, the relative importance of within-trial
variance decreases. Thus, if between-trial variability is relatively
high, as long as the accumulation process starts far enough from the
decision bound, starting even further from the decision bound can
make very little difference in the accuracy of behavioral choices.
Based on this insight, our bounded integration model incorporates
the assumption that between-trial variability is relatively high.
Simulation Model Details
We simulate data from monkey A, for whom we have the largest
and cleanest data set. As we shall see, it is possible to provide a
good qualitative fit to the data from this monkey within the
framework of the ideas described above. After considering monkey
A, we will return to consider the data from monkey T, which is
both noisier and more perplexing in certain ways.
Our model shares many features with the LIP portion of the model
presented by Mazurek et al [23], but we do not directly simulate the
sensory inputs from MT. Rather, we simply consider the input to the
accumulators to have both within and between trial variability as
indicated above. Our simulation incorporates the following features:
(1) The starting point of each of the two accumulators is affected
by both relative and absolute reward. In our simulations, the
starting point of the T1 accumulator is initialized to the
empirically observed activation level at the time the motion
stimulus begins to affect activation (the ‘‘dip’’), approximately
200 msec after motion onset. The starting value assigned to
the T2 accumulator is based on the empirically measured T1
values, assuming that the values for T2 are symmetric to those
measured for T1: (T2 HL = T1 LH, T2 LH = T1 HL; T2
LL = T1 LL, T2 HH = T1 HH).
(2) The information accumulation process is affected by both within-
and between-trial variability and also by an urgency signal. The
activation of the T1 accumulator is updated according to:
Equation 10:
at ðÞ ~at {1 ðÞ zbzaC0zswg t ðÞ
Where, as previously discussed, C’ is equal to the stimulus
Decision Signals in LIP
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 15 February 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 2 | e9308coherence C perturbed by a sample of Gaussian noise with
standard deviation sb. For the T2 accumulator, C’ is replaced with
–C’. Within-trial, moment-to-moment Gaussian noise with
standard deviation sw is added independently to each of the two
accumulators. The parameter b is a positive constant reflecting an
overall tendency for activation to increase during the motion
period, corresponding to the ‘‘urgency’’ signal of Mazurek, et al.
[23] and other investigators. (See the caption of Figure 11 for
parameter values.)
(3) Information integration occurs for a period of time equal
to the duration of the motion stimulus unless the bound
is reached before the end of the integration period (see next).
In comparing the simulation to data, we treat integration
as beginning after a 200 msec propagation delay, so that
the simulated processing interval corresponds to the period
from 200 to 700 msec post stimulus onset approximately.
(4) Integration is bounded, so that when the activation of one
accumulator reaches the bound value h, integration of
sensory information in both accumulators ceases. The
bound is viewed, not as an upper limit on neural activity,
but as an internal benchmark on activation, such that when
this benchmark is reached, the process of integration
ceases, affecting both accumulators equally. Although
integration ceases when the bound is reached, the
influence of the urgency signal continues until the end of
the trial.
(5) The behavioral choice is assigned to the accumulator whose
activation value is highest at the end of the motion period. In
Figure 11. A model account of the neural and behavioral observations in Monkey A. A. Empirically observed behavioral data from
monkey A (left) and simulated behavioral results (right) of the competing accumulator model described in the text. Four colors indicate the four
reward conditions: HH (red), LL (blue), HL (black; LH (green). B. Empirically observed physiological data from monkey A (left) and simulated
physiological results (right) for the imbalanced reward conditions. Solid lines indicated trials ending in T1 choices; dashed lines illustrate trials ending
in T2 choices. Color code is the same as in the top panels. C. Empirically observed physiological data from monkey A (left) and simulated
physiological results (right) for the balanced reward conditions. Solid and dashed lines, and the color code, are the same as in the preceding panels.
Parameter values used in the reported fits are as follows: b=10; a=0.5; sb=14; sw=1,h=22. Values are in units of seconds and Hertz.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009308.g011
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always corresponds to the accumulator that reached the
bound and caused integration to cease.
(6) Parameter values were estimated according to the following
procedure. Parameters a and sb were first approximated by
selecting values that permitted a good fit to the behavioral
data ignoring the effect of the bound and of the within-trial
variability sw, which has a negligible effect after 500 msec of
integration. These approximate values could be directly
estimated without the need to run the simulation. Estimation
of the urgency signal, b, and the activation bound value, h,
required searching the parameter space via simulation.
Simulation results reported in the figure were based on
25000 simulated trials for each of the 52 combinations of
stimulus and reward conditions.
Simulation Results
Figure 11 shows the results of the simulation (right column),
along with the comparable psychophysical and neural data from
Monkey A (left column). The model captures several important
features of both the behavioral and neural data. We begin with a
consideration of the behavioral performance: The probability of a
T1 choice as a function of coherence is identical in the HH and LL
conditions (Fig. 11A), even though the accumulation process starts
at a higher level in the HH than in the LL condition (Fig. 11C); the
choice curves for HL and LH conditions are simply shifted to the
left or right compared to either the HH and LL curves, in the
simulation as in the behavioral data. These patterns are expected
based on our analysis above. The high between-trial variability in
the drift parameter is the dominant source of variability affecting
the choice outcome, so that the outcome is relatively immune to
the location of the bound. In essence, the slopes of the behavioral
curves depend on the ratio of the parameters a and sb, and the
bound on integration has relatively little importance.
The relative positions of the curves along the x-axis reflect the
difference in the starting values of the accumulators, which persists
throughout the integration period. Ignoring the bound, and taking
thechoicetobedeterminedbytheaccumulatorthatismoreactiveat
the end of the motion period, the magnitude of the shift can be
directlycalculatedfromtheratio Sd/s(500),whereSd isthe difference
in the starting points of the accumulators (Sd=S1–S2)a n ds(500) is
the standard deviation of the difference in activation of the two
accumulators at the end of the motion period, see Equation 8. Once
again, because of the high between-trial variability, the presence of
the bound and the within-trial variability has a negligible effect on
behavior, with the result that the curves are simply shifted left or
right by an amount determined by the above ratio.
Because the bound does not impact behavior, an alternative
account of the behavioral data would be to suppose that there is no
bound on the integration process, and that the monkey simply
chooses the most active accumulator at the time he receives the
signal to respond. We would not rule out such an account, and we
consider such a possibility further in the Discussion. However,
including a bound on integration helps us to account for many
features of the physiological data, which we now consider:
1) For trials ending in T1 choices, the model captures the
negative acceleration (i.e. saturation) of the slopes of the
neural activation curves near the end of the motion
integration period (Fig. 11 B and C). This negative
acceleration reflects the effects of reaching the decision
bound, which occurs on many but not all trials. For the
activation bound parameter value that was used in the
simulation, one of the two accumulators reaches a bound on
approximately 70% of the trials on average, although the
fraction increases with the absolute value of the stimulus
coherence C and when the direction of motion is congruent
with reward bias. The bound is reached at different times on
different trials, accounting for the gradual flattening of all
four activation curves for T1 choices.
2) In the model as in the data, the neural activation curves for
T1 choices in the HL and LH conditions converge
noticeably but not completely during the motion integration
period (Fig. 11B, compare the solid green and solid black
curves). The difference in the T1 activation curves is due in
part to the different mixture of coherences contributing to
T1 choice trials as discussed above in conjunction with
Figure 10, and also to the fact that activations tend to reach
the T1 bound, and thus stop growing, sooner (and more
often) on average for HL than for LH choices. Convergence
to exactly the same level would be expected if the bound was
reached on all T1 choice trials. In the model, however, the
bound is not actually reached on all trials (point 4 above); on
these trials the decision is simply cast in favor of the
accumulator with the highest activation level (point 5 above).
Thus the T1 activation curves in the model tend toward
convergence in the HL and LH conditions without actually
reaching the same level.
3) In both the model and the data, the HL and LH activation
curves converge for T2 choices as well (Fig. 11B). The same
factors that affect convergence of the T1 choice curves are
also in play in the T2 choice curves.
4) In the model, there is a subtle trend toward convergence of
the HH and LL curves for T1 choices (Fig. 11C); this effect
is due to the fact that accumulation terminates at the bound
for the T1 accumulator sooner on average (and on a higher
number of trials) in the HH condition. The effect is subtle
because the initial offset between the HH and LL curves is
smaller than between the HL and LH curves, resulting in a
smaller difference in termination times, and because there is
no difference in the mix of coherence values terminating in
T1 choice for the HH and LL conditions. In the data, the
HH and LL curves are similar in shape for T1 choices, as in
the simulation; the difference between the curves seems
slightly smaller toward the end of integration than at the
beginning. While the effect in the data is unlikely to be
statistically reliable, the subtlety of the effect in the
simulation is such that a statistically reliable effect in the
data would not be expected.
5) The model reproduces the rising slope of the accumulation
curves for T2 choices near the end of the motion period in
all four reward conditions (Fig. 11B and C, dotted curves).
This is due to the ‘‘urgency’’ signal represented by
parameter b in Equation 10, which continues to affect
activation in the model after integration stops. The urgency
signal captures the intuition that a premium exists on
reaching decisions within a finite time, even on low
coherence trials when evidence may accumulate very slowly
[23]. Thus both accumulators are driven toward their
bounds at a slow but steady rate throughout the trial,
independent of evidence accumulation. This factor is less
apparent earlier in the trial, where activations reflect both
the stimulus effect and the urgency signal.
Overall, the simulation captures both the behavioral data and
most of the main features of the physiological data from monkey
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findings appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that reward
affects the starting point of an integration process that is subject to
high between-trial variability and that employs a decision bound
placed such that it is reached only on a subset of trials.
We now consider briefly whether the model described here can
account for the data from monkey T. As indicated earlier, several
features of monkey T’s data are consistent with monkey A’s data
and thus with the model: 1) both absolute and relative reward
effects are present (Figs. 4–6), 2) the offset in the starting point of
the accumulation process is clear (Fig. 9B), and 3) the dynamics of
the accumulation process are similar to monkey A once the effects
of coherence are controlled for (Fig. 10). The most perplexing
aspect of monkey T’s data is seen most clearly in Figure 4. The
firing rate trace for the HH condition (solid red curve) is initially
lower than the trace for the HL condition (solid black curve),
consistent with the relative reward effect. About 200 msec into the
motion viewing period, however, the traces reverse order, with
average firing rate becoming higher for the HH condition, and the
reversal holds for the duration of the trial. This crossover would
not be expected in our model; as in the data and the simulation of
monkey A, we would expect the curve from the HH condition to
converge toward, but not cross, the curve for the HL condition.
The cross-over is anomalous, not only from the point of view of the
bounded integration model, but also from the point of view of the
overall pattern of findings, in which high relative reward of the RF
target is typically associated with greater LIP activity.
A variety of approaches might be taken to account for this
perplexing result from monkey T. For example, the data could be
explained if we relax the assumption that the integration bound is
kept the same across all of the reward conditions. If the bound
were adjusted upward in the HH condition, keeping it low (and
approximately constant) in all of the other reward conditions, the
model might then provide a reasonably good approximate account
of all facets of monkey T’s data. We emphasize that this is only one
possible account, and we do not specifically wish to advocate for it.
We mention it only to make the point that there is at least one way
to explain the anomalous results seen in Figure 4 with a bounded
integration framework.
Discussion
We examined the dynamics of neural activity in LIP while
rhesus monkeys performed a 2AFC motion discrimination task
under conditions of equal and unequal payoffs signaled at the
beginning of the trial. As reported previously [42], psychophysical
performance was indistinguishable during the two balanced
reward conditions (HH and LL), but imbalanced rewards (HL
and LH) biased the monkeys’ choices strongly toward the target
associated with the higher reward. Thus the absolute value of the
target in the RF did not affect choices in our paradigm, whereas
the relative value of the RF target affected choices substantially. The
coherence of the visual stimulus also exerted a strong effect on
choices, as evidenced by the well-formed psychometric functions in
Figure 2.
In the Introduction we posed four questions about neural
processing in LIP to be addressed in these experiments, two
descriptive and two mechanistic. At the descriptive level, we find
that single LIP neurons reflect all three variables that we
manipulated—absolute value, relative value and coherence—in
addition to the well-known representation of behavioral choice
(e.g. [51]). The neural representation of these variables was
dynamic, with each variable influencing average firing rate in a
stereotyped sequence at the population level (Fig. 6). Upon
presentation of the reward cue, LIP neurons responded rapidly to
the absolute value of the target in the response field, with higher
value targets generating higher firing rates. Within 200 ms, this
neural representation of absolute value was modulated by the
value of the target outside the response field, creating a
representation of the relative value of the RF target. Importantly,
the representation of relative value was most pronounced at the
start of the motion epoch, consistent with a mechanistic effect of
biasing the starting point of the motion integration process (see
below). As the motion epoch developed, however, the represen-
tation of both relative and absolute value faded and the effects of
motion coherence and behavioral choice emerged. The represen-
tation of choice quickly dominated LIP responses and persisted
through the time of the saccade. Interestingly, the representation
of absolute value persisted in reduced form until the end of the
trial, even though it exerted no effect on the psychometric
functions. The signals we observed in LIP were typically
multiplexed at the single neuron level; a large proportion of
neurons in both animals were influenced by multiple variables,
especially in the early delay period (Fig. 7).
Most of these descriptive observations have precedents in the
existing literature. Modulation of LIP visual responses by absolute
reward level has been reported previously [30,40,41], as have the
effects of relative reward [30,32,34], motion coherence
[22,49,51,52,55] and behavioral choice [30,51]. A single point
of conflict with the previous literature is our observation that a
dramatic effect of absolute reward is evident at the onset of the cue
period and persists at a reduced level until the end of the trial. This
effect is evident in the comparison of HH and LL conditions in the
average PSTH’s of Figure 3 (for both T1 and T2 choices) as well as
in the regression results of Figure 6. In contrast, Dorris and
Glimcher [32], using a two-alternative, forced-choice ‘‘inspection
game’’, reported that LIP activity represents relative value only,
with no difference in firing rate observed between blocks of trials
with standard vs. double reward size (their Fig. 10). Dorris and
Glimcher thus concluded that LIP encodes the ‘‘relative subjective
desirability’’ of different spatial locations.
It seems likely that the effect of absolute reward is more salient
in our data because our behavioral paradigm required an explicit
evaluation of payoff size on every trial due to the random
interleaving of reward conditions. In the behavioral paradigm used
by Dorris and Glimcher, overall reward size was kept constant
throughout an entire block of trials; the variable that the monkey
needed to judge from trial to trial was the likelihood of being
‘‘inspected’’ by the computer opponent, with the consequence of
receiving no reward at all. In contrast, successful harvesting in our
paradigm depended strongly on accurate evaluation of the
constantly changing payoffs associated with each possible choice.
The presence of the absolute reward effect in our data indicates
that—in the context of our behavioral paradigm—LIP activity at
any one spatial location does not, by itself, completely specify the
value of that location relative to other locations. Nor does it
completely specify the probability of choosing a particular option
on a given trial (e.g. [34,56]). More generally, however, we agree
with Dorris and Glimcher and with Sugrue et al. that relative
value is easily calculated from neural activity in LIP; it simply
requires a comparison of activity at the two locations in LIP
representing the choice targets (see below).
Mechanism of the Effect of Payoffs on Behavioral Choice
The most important insight provided by our study concerns the
mechanistic basis of the effect of unequal payoffs on behavioral
choice. In a psychophysical and modeling study of the effect of
payoffs on discrimination near sensory threshold, Diederich and
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mechanisms. Their ‘‘two-stage processing hypothesis’’ corresponds
approximately to the cartoon in Figure 8B. This hypothesis
postulates a first-stage accumulator that accrues information about
the relative payoffs of the two choices, which results in an offset to
the starting points of the two sensory accumulators (second stage).
Their ‘‘drift-rate change hypothesis’’ corresponds to the cartoon in
Figure 8C, in which payoff information exerts its effects via the
rate of accumulation of sensory information in the diffusion
process, and their ‘‘bound-change hypothesis’’ corresponds to the
cartoon in Figure 8D. Diederich and Busemeyer found that the
two-stage processing hypothesis accounted best for their psycho-
physical data, suggesting that payoff information influences
choices through an offset in the starting point of the sensory
accumulation process. This conclusion is consistent with the
microstimulation data of Hanks and colleagues [27], which
suggests that artificial activation of LIP during the motion
discrimination task influences the initial offset of the neural
accumulators.
Our electrophysiological data strongly support the offset
mechanism proposed by Diederich and Busemeyer and by Hanks
and colleagues, directly demonstrating the hypothesized offset at
the initial point of accumulation of sensory evidence (the ‘‘dip’’—
Fig. 9; Fig. 11B and C). In addition, our data argue strongly
against the drift-rate change hypothesis, showing that the initial
rates of accumulation are nearly identical for the HL and LH
conditions, and that the eventual direction of divergence (LH slope
steeper than HL) is opposite to the prediction of the drift-rate
change hypothesis (Fig. 10).
Because we used a fixed-interval psychophysical procedure, not
a reaction time procedure, we are unable to evaluate directly the
predictions of the bound-change hypothesis. However, our
simulations showed that a bound-change is not necessary to
account for our data, at least for the case of monkey A, the monkey
from who we have the largest and cleanest data set. The primary
features of this data set, both behavioral and neural, can be
reproduced by a simple model that incorporates 1) a payoff-driven
offset in the starting point of accumulation, 2) intra- and inter-trial
noise in the input to the accumulators, and 3) the assumption that
accumulation ceases and a decision is made when either
accumulator reaches a stationary bound. It should be noted that
there may be other ways to account for the data from monkey A
that omit a bound from the model. In our fixed-interval task, for
example, accumulation could continue until the end of the
stimulus period, and the decision could be reached from a simple
comparison of the values of the two accumulators. Although
further simulations would be required to verify this, it is likely that,
with additional assumptions, such an approach could account for
many aspects of data.
Our simulations make sense of several otherwise puzzling
aspects of our behavioral and neural data. First, the simulations
defuse any concern about the presence of an absolute reward
signal during the critical motion and early delay periods. At first
blush, the absolute reward signal seems worrisome because
behavioral decisions appear to be based solely on the relative
value of the two targets (Fig. 2). The presence of an irrelevant
absolute reward signal during the critical time of decision
formation might lead one to doubt whether LIP neurons actually
contribute to the primary process of decision formation. Our
simulations of the results from monkey A, however, nicely
reproduce both the behavioral data (Fig. 11A) and the absolute
reward effect (Fig. 11C), demonstrating that the two data sets are
compatible with the notion of bounded accumulation in LIP. In
the model, the absolute reward effect exerts little effect on
simulated behavioral choices because the absolute value signal is
present in both accumulators (T1 and T2) during the accumulation
process and thus grants no advantage to either accumulator. In
essence, the relative value that governs decisions results from the
relative activation of the two accumulators; any signal that is
common to both will have little or no effect on behavioral choices.
Second, the simulations rationalize the results of the otherwise
puzzling slope analysis of the T1 accumulator under the unequal
reward conditions (Fig. 10). Not only are these accumulation
slopes inconsistent with the drift-rate change hypothesis, they
actually trend in the opposite direction, with slopes rising more
steeply for the LH than for the HL conditions. The simulation
shows, however, that this is a logical result of the model
assumption that all accumulation ceases when the bound is
reached by either accumulator. Because the bound is reached
earlier on average and more often in the HL than the LH
conditions (for T1 choices), the HL curve saturates more strongly
than the LH curve, producing the tendency toward convergence.
Finally, the model accounts well for the behavioral observation
that performance is nearly identical under the HH and LL reward
conditions. One might have expected performance to be worse in
the HH condition because of the closer proximity of the initial value
of the accumulator to the sound, which should permit within-trial
noise in the accumulation process to exert a greater effect on the
final decisions. In our simulations, however, this effect is neutralized
by the presence of between-trial noise in the motion-dependent
input signal tothe accumulators, which renders behavioralaccuracy
relatively insensitive to the distance between the starting point and
the bound. Between-trial noise in the reliability of the motion-
dependent input signal may arise in part from the different patterns
of dots employed on each trial for a given motion coherence. The
value of our between-trial variability parameter is fairly large (twice
as large, for example, as the fitted value in Ditterich, 2006). Holding
all other features of our model constant, the value of this parameter
is rather tightly constrained by the data. It is difficult to know
whether this discrepancy should be a concern, given that our
experiment differed in many details from the one modeled by
Ditterich, and given that parameter values can differ substantially
between individual monkeys. A smaller value for between-trial
variability might fit our data if other features of the model were
adjusted. Whether such adjustments would lead to a better account
over all should be explored in further research.
As noted at the end of the results section, the clear picture
presented in the data from monkey A is not quite so clear in
monkey T. However, the data from monkey T exhibit most of the
same features observed in monkey A. Most importantly, both
absolute and relative reward effects are present in LIP activity at
the onset of the motion period, consistent with the idea that
reward shifts the starting place of an information integration
process. The cross-over of neural activity in the comparison of the
HL and HH conditions is unexpected, but can be accounted for
within the bounded integration theory if the bound were set higher
in the HH condition than in the other reward conditions.
Interpretations of LIP Activity
Substantial energy, both conceptual and experimental, has been
expended in seeking a general theory of LIP computation [57,58].
Early efforts attempted to distinguish between interpretations that
were rooted in sensory (attention) versus motor (intention)
perspectives [59,60,61,62]. Although this controversy inspired a
series of heroic experiments attempting to distinguish between
these perspectives, the effort was ultimately inconclusive, in part
because researchers could not agree on operational definitions of
the postulated cognitive processes. At a deeper level, however, the
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to move the eyes was probably doomed from the start because the
neural systems that mediate attention and intention are funda-
mentally inseparable. Evidence emerging in the last decade
suggests strongly that the neural structures that mediate orienting
movements of the eyes and head also mediate covert spatial
attention [63,64,65,66,67,68]. It now seems likely that covert
spatial attention (attending to a spatial location different from the
current direction of gaze) is an advanced adaptation of basic
oculomotor circuitry, and is thus unlikely to be cleanly separable
from internal preparation to move the eyes, no matter how heroic
the experimental design.
A similar problem may exist with more recent suggestions
[41,69,70] that reward and value effects that have been
documented in recent studies of LIP [30,32,34] should be
subsumed under the rubric of attention. Maunsell [69], for
example, has pointed out that studies in experimental animals
deliberately manipulate attention by enforcing reward contingen-
cies, and that studies of reward value rarely try to exclude the
possibility that the observed neural effects are actually the result of
attention covarying monotonically with reward value. It is thus
possible that ‘‘some studies of attention and reward might have
been looking at exactly the same neural signals’’ [69]. For
example, the biasing effects of unequal rewards demonstrated in
the current study could be easily interpreted as effects of attention.
Maunsell suggests experiments that might disentangle attention
and reward value, and some recent studies have attempted to do
just that [41,70]. We are open to the possibility of a clean
dissociation, but we are wary of the field again becoming
enmeshed in a controversy that is fundamentally irresolvable.
This danger is particularly acute if the notion of ‘‘value’’ is
extended (as it probably should be) beyond the promise of
immediate rewards to include acquisition of information pertinent
to acquiring rewards in the future (e.g. [71]). From an evolutionary
point of view, many of the phenomena that we refer to as attention
may have arisen from circuitry that originally implemented direct
reward-seeking behaviors, and these neural circuits may still
overlap considerably within our own brains, rendering clean
distinctions difficult at best.
We believe that a more promising way forward, adopted in this
and other recent studies, is the quantitative analysis of choice
behavior in rigorously controlled behavioral contexts (for reviews
see [26,72,73,74,75,76,77]). These studies attempt to encompass
within a single quantitative framework (signal detection theory and
its intellectual heirs) a rich array of well defined cognitive factors
that influence choice, including but not restricted to sensory
evidence, prior probabilities, reward value, and strategic interac-
tions with competitors. These studies have the cardinal virtue of
quantifying each proposed cognitive factor in terms of its impact
on choice, and defining each factor in formal equations or in
precisely specified simulations. Given these preconditions, scien-
tific investigation can progress naturally by the development of
new models that account demonstrably better for behavioral
choice and the underlying neural signals. This approach conforms
to Maunsell’s [69] call for ‘‘accurate descriptions of behaviorally
relevant information encoded in the brain,’’ and has the desirable
outcome that terminology becomes less important to the field than
quantitative understanding.
Perhaps the most general theory of LIP function that has come
forth in recent years is that LIP contains a ‘‘salience map’’ or
‘‘priority map’’ of space that encodes the potential behavioral
salience of each region of space [58,78,79]. Behavioral salience is
proposed to arise from bottom-up processes such as the sudden
appearance of a novel object [80,81] and by any internal analysis of
an object related to reward, arousal, choice, social significance
(top-down)—in short anything that an animal might find
significant either by natural inclination or by training [79].
Similarly, the output of the salience map can be used for any
behavioral purpose including covert attention, guidance of eye or
arm movements, etc. While intuitively congenial, the very
generality of this idea renders it necessarily qualitative. Different
behaviors will draw upon very different combinations of sensory
input, behavioral goals, reward potential, and social significance to
endow salience upon different regions of space. Thus quantitative
understanding of LIP function, as suggested above, is more likely
to arise from consideration of specific behavioral paradigms in
which relevant inputs can be specified precisely, possible neural
computations can be inferred from quantitative modeling of
behavioral data, and neural signals can be compared to the
internal computations postulated by the behavioral model [31,73].
From this point of view the notion of a salience map is a useful
heuristic for guiding inquiry, and most LIP data—including those
presented in this paper—are broadly consistent with the notion of
salience. But mechanistic understanding must ultimately emerge
from more precise consideration of specific behaviors.
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